Instituciones, cambio institucional y crecimiento económico: una revisión crítica del enfoque neoclásico

Cecilia Bermúdez

doi:10.18046/recs.i8.1129

Autores/as

Cecilia Bermúdez Universidad Nacional del Sur

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18046/recs.i8.1129

Palabras clave:

Crecimiento económico, Instituciones, Cambio institucional

Resumen

Este trabajo explora críticamente la relación entre instituciones y crecimiento económico en el marco de la teoría neoclásica. Se revisa la hipótesis de crecimiento económico basado en el sistema de derechos de propiedad, y se describen los principales problemas conceptuales y empíricos y las consecuencias que se desprenden de esta visión, en cuanto al diseño e implementación de políticas públicas. Finalmente, se estudia el debate sobre cambio institucional, comparando las dificultades de diversos enfoques para generar una explicación acerca de las causas que motivan cambios permanentes en la trayectoria de crecimiento económico de un país.

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