The Political Economy of the Chinese Market Economy Status given by Argentina and Brazil

Francisco Urdinez

doi:10.18046/recs.i14.1853

Autores/as

Francisco Urdinez University of São Paulo

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18046/recs.i14.1853

Palabras clave:

Estatuto de no economía de mercado, Antidumping, OMC, Brasil, Argentina

Resumen

El Protocolo de adhesión de China a la Organización Mundial del Comercio, firmado en Diciembre de 2001, permitió a otros países miembros considerar a China como un país sin economía de mercado (NME, por sus siglas en inglés) hasta finales del 2016. Este trabajo pretende responder a la pregunta: ¿Se puede medir el estatuto de economía del mercado (MES, por sus siglas en inglés) según su cumplimiento? La variable utilizada para medir el cumplimiento fue el número de investigaciones de antidumping iniciadas por país. Se espera que los países que reconocen a China el estatuto de economía del mercado, MES, realicen menos investigaciones antidumping que los que todavía consideran que ésta no tiene economía de mercado (NME). Esto explicaría por qué desde el 2001 el gobierno chino ha estado haciendo una enérgica campaña para ganar la condición de MES entre sus socios económicos.

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Biografía del autor/a

Francisco Urdinez, University of São Paulo

Doctoral candidate in International Studies at the Institute of International Relations at Universidade de São Paulo (USP) in Brazil. Scholar member of the Foundation for Research Support of the State of São Paulo (FAPESP). Bachelor’s degree in International Relations at the Universidad Católica de Córdoba (Argentina) and masters’ degree at USP.

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