Beyond Clientelism and Technique: The Political Distribution of Government Budget in Colombia
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18046/recs.i35.4745Keywords:
State Budget, Congress, Presidentialism, Distributive Politics, ColombiaAbstract
We examine the distribution of budget by the national executive power in a presidential system from the standpoint of the literature on tactical distribution. Our objective is to empirically test theories on the political rationale of this phenomenon. We begin with a comparative literature review, emphasizing voter and congress-oriented distribution. We derive three hypotheses that capture three distinct models: programmatic, voter-oriented, and legislative-oriented distribution. Then, we analyze an original dataset of budget distribution through cupos indicativos in Colombia during president Juan Manuel Santos’ first term (2010-2014). Using regression analyses, we show that increases in legislative representation have a positive association with the amount of resources distributed, which lend empirical support to theories of nonprogrammatic legislative-oriented distributive politics.
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